Abstract. Usage Control policies have been introduced to overcome issues related to the usage of resources. Indeed, a Usage Control policy takes into account attributes of subjects and resources which change over time. Hence, the policy is continuously enforced while an action is performed on a resource, and it is re-evaluated at every context change. This permits to revoke the access to a resource as soon as the new context violates the policy. The Usage Control model is very flexible, and mutable attributes can be exploited also to make a decision based on the actions that have been previously authorized and executed. This paper presents a history-based variant of U-XACML policies composed via process algebra-like operators in order to take trace of past actions made on resources by the subjects. In particular, we present a formalization of our idea through a process algebra and the enhanced logical architecture to enforce such policies.
Introduction
Modern IT systems can be very complex, implementing a large set of functionalities, and being composed by several components, which interact each other. Consequently, their security requirements could be complex as well, especially in case the resources to be protected are critical and/or valuable ones. This leads to the adoption of proper authorization systems to regulate the access to these resources and their usage. Through access control it is verified if the subject who wants to access a specific resource (perform an operation on such resource), holds such a right at request time, according to a specific policy. However, in environments where the context dynamically changes overtime, the access control does not re-evaluate the policy when the context changes. Such a necessity brought the adoption of the more flexible Usage Control (UCON) model. The UCON model has been defined in [9, 13] to extend the capability of traditional access control by introducing the continuous enforcement of the security policy while the access is in progress and interrupting this access as soon as the policy is not satisfied any more.
To meet the security needs of complex systems, the approach we propose in this paper exploits the capabilities of the Usage Control model by allowing policy makers to define History-based Usage Control policies, i.e., Usage Control policies, which define the allowed behaviour of subjects as a trace of actions which can be executed under some conditions. In fact, the Usage Control model allows policy makers to define policies where the rules that must be enforced change over-time depending on the current system state, and it also allows to define the rules to move from one state to the other. History-based Usage Control policies are necessary in those scenarios where the right of executing an action does not depend on that action only, but also on (a proper subset of) all the actions that have been previously executed on the system. For instance, the Chinese Wall policy [4] grants the right to access an object depending on the access operations previously performed by the same subject on the objects of the system.
Starting from the work in [5] , where the authors proposed U-XACML, a new policy language which enhances the original XACML with the UCON novelties, we propose to combine the U-XACML language with a process algebra language suitable for writing policies, such as the POLPA language [2] . In this way, we are able to express U-XACML policies defining the trace of actions that can be executed by subjects on objects, and to enforce them. The main advantage of adopting the POLPA language to combine U-XACML policies is that POLPA enables policy makers to define the user's behaviour they want to permit in a very simple way. In fact, POLPA operators are used by a policy maker to define in which order U-XACML polices must be enforced. Actually, this could be even done in U-XACML by properly exploiting mutable attributes, conditions, and obligations, but it would require an additional and not negligible effort from the policy makers. Hence, the main aim of our proposal is to allow policy makers to easily write History-based Usage Control policies relieving them from the burden of: (i) explicitly defining the required set of states; (ii) expressing in U-XACML the obligations, which define the transitions from each of the previously defined states to another, and insert such obligations in the existing U-XACML policies; (iii) expressing in U-XACML the conditions defining which of the U-XACML policies must be enforced in each of the states defined in (i), and insert such conditions in the existing U-XACML policies. This machinery will be helpful in several scenarios. A particular field of growing interest matching this description are the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), where IT is used to control and to interact with a physical system in different settings and environments, which might also include critical infrastructures. Misuse of the resources governing these systems might cause serious consequences. Hence, to exemplify the proposed approach, we consider an hydroelectric dam, as a critical infrastructure that needs to be protected against both insider and outsider attackers. In particular we consider a dam where allowed actions for subjects (policies), dynamically change according to the current hazard level (state) reported for the system. In these systems, the transitions between different hazard levels are regulated by specific rules, which are reported in the policies as well.
The paper is structured as follows: next section recalls some basic information about the Usage Control Model and the U-XACML policies. Section 3 presents our approach to enhance U-XACML policies with the possibility of managing execution traces. In particular, we present a formalization of history based policy through process algebra like operators and transition systems. We also present an enriched architecture in which we introduce the possibility of managing the change of state occurring after the execution of each action described into the History-based policy. Section 5 exemplifies our approach on a real scenario of a critical infrastructure: an Hydroelectric dam. Section 6 compares our approach with existing works and Section 7 draws the conclusion of the paper and lists some ongoing and future works.
Usage Control Model and U-XACML
This section recalls some notions about the Usage Control model (UCON) and the extension of the XACML language able to manage usage control policies, U-XACML.
Usage Control Model
The Usage Control model (UCON), defined in [9, 13] , encompasses and extends the existing access control models, by introducing new features in the decision process with respect to traditional Access Control models, such as the mutability of attributes and the continuity of policy enforcement. These features are meant to guarantee that the right of a subject to use a resource holds not only at access request time, but also while the access is in progress. UCON policies consist of the following core components:
Subjects and Objects. The subjects are the entities who exercise their rights on the objects (resources) by performing actions on them. Actions. The actions represent the operations performed by the subjects on the objects. Attributes. Attributes are paired to subjects, objects, actions, and environment to describe their features. An attribute is immutable when its value does not change frequently, and can be updated only through an administrative action, e.g., the role of the subject. Instead, an attribute is mutable when its value changes over time because of the normal operation of the system. Mutable attributes change their values as consequence of the policy enforcement. In fact, a Usage Control policy includes attribute update statements, i.e., policy rules that include assignments of values to attributes, and it specifies whether this attribute updates must be executed before (pre-update), during (on-update), or after (post-update) the execution of the access action. As an example, let us consider the mutable attribute, which represents the number of concurrent accesses to a resource R. The value of this attribute is incremented by a pre-update statement in the policy when a subject is authorized to initiate an access to R, and it is decremented by a post-update statement in the policy when a subject terminates an existing access to R. The value of a mutable attribute can change also as a consequence of the execution of actions not regulated by the usage control policy. For instance, the attribute that describes the physical location of a subject changes when the subject moves from one place to another. Finally, other attributes change their value independently of the user behaviour, e.g., the CPU load.
A UCON policy can describe one of the following:
Authorizations are predicates that evaluate subject and object attributes and the requested right to decide whether the subject may access the object or not. The evaluation of the authorization predicates can be performed before executing the access (pre-authorizations), or continuously while the access is in progress (onauthorizations) to promptly react to mutable attribute changes. Conditions are environmental or system-oriented decision factors, i.e., dynamic factors that do not depend on subjects or objects. Hence, the evaluation of conditions involves attributes of the environment and of the action, and it can be executed before (pre-conditions) or during (on-conditions) the execution of the action. Obligations are decision factors which verify whether a subject has satisfied some mandatory requirements before performing an action (pre-obligations), or whether a subject continuously satisfies these requirements while performing the access (onobligations). Obligations can be enforced after the execution of an action as well (post-obligations). In this case, they cannot affect the execution of the action, but they can be used, for instance, for auditing or notification purposes.
The continuous evaluation of on-authorizations, on-conditions, and on-obligations could result in a policy violation while an access is in progress. In this case, the action is properly interrupted, and the result of the Usage Control policy enforcement is set to revokeAccess. Instead, if the Usage Control policy is always satisfied while the action is executed, and the action finishes normally, the result of the policy enforcement is set to endAccess.
U-XACML
U-XACML [5] is an extension of the XACML language that has been defined to express Usage Control policies. In fact, XACML [1] is a standard developed by the OASIS consortium to express and manage access control policies in a distributed environment, but it does not have specific constructs to express the continuity of policy enforcement.
To represent the continuity of policy enforcement, the U-XACML language allows the policy maker to specify when the evaluation of a condition must be executed by adding a clause, DecisionTime, in the <Condition> clause. The conditions whose decision time is set to pre are usual XACML conditions, which are evaluated at access request time, while the conditions whose decision time is set to on must be continuously evaluated while the access is in progress. U-XACML extends <ObligationExpression> in the same way. In fact, the DecisionTime clause determines when the obligation must be executed. The admitted values for the DecisionTime clause are: pre (pre-obligations, i.e., usual XACML obligations), on (onobligations), and post (post-obligations).
Finally, U-XACML introduces a new element, <AttrUpdates>, to define attribute updates. This element includes a number of <AttrUpdate> elements to specify each update action. Each <AttrUpdate> element also specifies when the update must be performed through the clause UpdateTime which can have one of the following values: pre (pre-update), on (on-update), and post (post-update).
This paper proposes History-based Usage Control policies, i.e., it combines Usage Control policies by using process-algebra like operators to obtain a policy on execution trace of actions. The resulting policy is named History-based U-XACML policy.
As previously explained, Usage Control policies extend access control ones because they take into account the duration of the actions. In fact, a Usage Control policy defines predicates, which must be satisfied while the action is in progress, i.e., from the beginning to the end of the action. As soon as one of these ongoing predicates is violated, the Usage Control policy evaluation returns a revokeAccess, and the execution of the related action is properly interrupted. On the other hand, endAccess is the result of the policy enforcement when the action terminates normally.
Enhancing Usage Control policies with History-based capabilities is meant to enable the policy maker to describe the allowed behaviour of the subjects on the system by defining which is the Usage Control policy that must be enforced in a specific moment. In other words, the policy maker exploits process-algebra like operators to define the set of states of the system, which Usage Control policy must be enforced in each of these states, and which new states result from the enforcement of these Usage Control policies. Each History-based Usage Control policy specifies its scope, which defines to which entity the state refers to. In particular, we define three distinct scopes: SUBJECT, OBJECT, or GLOBAL. If the scope is SUBJECT, each subject of the scenario has his own state, and distinct subjects are paired to distinct states. Hence, when a subject s tries to perform an action, the system takes into account the state paired with s to select the set of Usage Control policies to be enforced, and updates this state as a consequence of the action. Hence, the current state paired to subject s depends on the actions that s performed on the objects of the system. Instead, if the policy scope is OBJECT, each object of the scenario has its own state. In this case, when a subject wants to access an object o, is the state paired with o which determines the set of Usage Control policies that must be enforced. The action performed by any subject on the object o results in an update of the state paired to o. Finally, if the scope is GLOBAL the state is shared, i.e., the actions performed by all the subjects on all the objects affect the same state. Example 1. Let us suppose that a History-based Usage Control policy HU P ABC with scope SUBJECT states that a subject can execute action C only after actions A and B, executed in any order. Moreover, the policy requires that A is entirely executed, i.e., it is not interrupted before its natural end because of a policy violation, and if A is interrupted no more actions can be executed by that subject. The initial state S 0 enforces the Usage Control policies U P A and U P B , thus, allowing to perform (under some authorizations conditions and obligations that are immaterial here) respectively, actions A or B. When the subject s tries to perform action A, the policy U P A allows the execution of A and, if A is not interrupted because of a policy violation, the current state of s is changed to S 1 , otherwise the current state is changed in a fail state S f ail . The new state S 1 enforces a Usage Control policy U P B which allows the execution of the action B. Hence, if s tries to perform the action B, the Usage Control policy U P B allows the action. U P B changes the current state of s to S 3 regardless from the result returned by the policy. S 3 enforces a further Usage Control policy, U P C , which allows s to execute action C. We remark that since U P A , U P B , and U P C are Usage Control policies, the actions A, B, and C could be interrupted by the Usage Control system during their execution because of a policy violation. In our example, the policy HU P ABC does not allow to change the state from S 0 to S 1 if the action A is interrupted. In this case, the action A is revoked and S 0 changes in S f ail .
Formal specification of a Hystory-based U-XACML policy
History-based U-XACML policies are the composition of U-XACML policies through (some of) the behavioural operators of the POlicy Language based on Process Algebra (POLPA [2] ). We chose the U-XACML language to express Usage Control policies because it directly supports all the features of the Usage Control model. The POLPA language is instead a policy language able to describe the behaviour of an entity in terms of allowed sequences of security relevant actions. The idea is to use process algebra operators to combine UCON-specific policies instead of processes. Let us assume that each Usage Control policy U P is paired with one action only, α U P , that can be differently executed according to the state in which it starts (similarly to what we said for subject and object above), and may also differently end, according to the result of the enforcement of the usage control policy. Indeed, U P terminates with endAccess if the execution of α U P terminates normally, or with revokeAccess, if some changes occur in the context and the execution of α U P is revoked by the system. We model these conditions with the predicate exit(U P, r), that holds if the policy U P has been enforced with result r (r ∈ {endAccess, revokeAccess}). Hence:
where denotes no actions, α U P denotes the action α associated to the policy U P , α ea U P is α U P that correctly ends, i.e., no policy violations occur during the α U P execution, and α ra U P denotes what happens when the execution of α U P is interrupted by the system (revoked).
A History-based U-XACML policy, hereafter denoted by HU P , results from the composition of U-XACML policies, shortly U P i , according to the following grammar: HU P ::= 0 U P U P.exit(U P, r) HU P 1 ; HU P 2 HU P 1 orHU P 2 Remark 1. We assume that each U P 1 , U P 2 , . . . , U P n refers to a single action α U P1 , α U P2 , . . . , α U Pn respectively. Furthermore, we also assume to compose a finite number of U P i that are processed one by one. Consequently, we do not consider the interleaving operator (par) in the provided syntax. It is worth noting that we are currently working in order to consider also parallelism and message exchange to be able to express both policies referred to more than one action and possible interleaving policies, e.g., multi-session ones.
The informal semantics is the following: -0 denotes that there are no more policies to enforce; Basic Case.
δ(U P ) = revokeAccess U P.exit(U P, endAccess) −→ U P.exit(U P, endAccess) revokeAccess.
δ(U P ) = endAccess U P.exit(U P, revokeAccess) −→ U P.exit(U P, revokeAccess) δ(U P ) = revokeAccess U P.exit(U P, revokeAccess) Table 1 . Semantics rules for inferring the admissible behaviour of HUP.
-U P denotes the basic U-XACML policy; -U P.exit(U P, r) is the basic policy followed by the predicate exit stating the result of the enforcement of U P (specified by r, where r ∈ {endAccess, revokeAccess}).
The evaluation of exit(U P, r) depends on the function δ that works as follows: If U P permits the execution of an action, and this action normally terminates (α ea U P ), then δ(U P ) = endAccess Instead, if this action is interrupted because of a policy violation (α ra U P ), then δ(U P ) = revokeAccess. Note that, when the evaluation U P by δ does not match the policy requirement, e.g., δ(U P ) = revokeAccess and the policy is U P.exit(U P, endAccess), no action is performed ( ) and the policy to be enforced does not change.
-HU P 1 ; HU P 2 is the sequential operator. It represents the possibility of behaving as HU P 1 and then as HU P 2 . Note that, both HU P 1 and HU P 2 are composed by a finite number of U P 1 i and U P 2 j , where i, j ∈ I is a finite set of indexes. -HU P 1 orHU P 2 is the choice operator. It represents the non deterministic choice between HU P 1 and HU P 2 . Hence, HU P 1 orHU P 2 choices to behave either as HU P 1 or HU P 2 in a non deterministic way.
Formally, the behaviour of a History-Based Usage Control policy HU P can be modelled by Labelled Transition System, LTS, parametrized by a labelling function δ, named δ − LT S. Such a function permits to evaluate the exit predicate of each U P i composing HUP in each state of the δ − LT S.
Hence, let HU P be associated to a set of states S, which is composed by an initial state, s 0 , and all the sets of states S HU Pi of each of HU P i , with i ∈ I and I finite, composing HU P .
Definition 1 (δ − LT S for a HUP). Let HU P composed by a finite number of HU P i . M = (S, Act, T , δ) is a δ − LT S modelling a HU P , where -S = {s|s 0 ∪ i∈I S HU Pi }, s 0 is the initial state; -Act is the set of security relevant actions α of the HU P . We consider for each action α, four labels: , denoting no action, α U Pi managed by each U P i , α ea U Pi denotes that the action has been correctly terminated, while α ra U Pi denotes that the action has been revoked; -T ⊆ S × Act × S is the transition relation, driven by the rules in Table 1 . -δ : S → {endAccess, revokeAccess} is a labelling function that associates the value of the exit condition to the U P i enforced in that state. In practice, it is the enforcement decision function that, by evaluation of the access request, enforces the usage policy U P i during the execution of the action in order to evaluate if it terminates correctly or it is revoked.
Remark 2. As usual for (process) description languages, other derived operators may be defined. By using the constant definition, the sequence and the derived parallel (see Remark 1) operators, the iteration and replication operators, it(HU P ) and rec(HU P ) resp., can be derived. Informally, it(HU P ) behaves as the iteration of HU P zero or more times, while rec(HU P ) is the parallel composition of the same process an unbounded number of times.
With reference to Example 1, the History-based Usage Control policy HU P ABC (graphically represented in Figure 1 ) can be expressed exploiting the POLPA operators previously described as follows:
((U PA.exit(U PA, endAccess)); U PB; U PC ) or (U PA.exit(U PA, revokeAccess)) or (U PB; (((U PA.exit(U PA, endAccess)); U PC ) or (U PA.exit(U PA, revokeAccess))))
The exit(U P A , revokeAccess) condition launches the A ra action. This specifies the state reached by the system once the A action is revoked. The exit(U P A , endAccess) condition requires that the enforcement of the policy U P A returns endAccess, i.e., that A regularly terminates and it is labelled with A ea . Note that, in this example we associate an enforcement result to both the revokeAccess and endAccess conditions. If it is not the case, according to Table 1 the system does not terminate and the policy may be enforced again. On the other hand, because of the absence of the exit condition after U P B , the policy HU P ABC allows the action B to either terminate normally or to be revoked. After each sequence in which A correctly terminated, the policy U P C is taken into account.
Logical Architecture
The UCON model fosters the concept of Continuity of Policy Enforcement. In fact, the attribute mutability introduces the necessity to perform the Usage Control policy evaluation process continuously while an access is in progress. This is because the values of the attributes that previously authorized the access could change in such a way that the access right does not hold any longer. In this case, the access is revoked as soon as the policy violation is detected.
The logical architecture of the proposed History-based Usage Control framework is depicted in Figure 2 , and it is an extension of the one defined in [6] which, in turn, is an extension of the XACML reference architecture [1] to enable the policy enforcement continuity. The extension to the UCON architecture proposed in this paper concerns the management of the state of the system, which is required to enable the history-based capability. In Figure 2 , this extension is represented by the components State Handler (SH), State PIP (P IP s ), and Transition Manager (TM), which are described in details in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2. The following of this section, instead, gives a very brief description of the components of the UCON service defined in [6] .
Attribute Managers (AMs) manage the attributes of subjects, resources, and environment. An AM could run as a component of the Usage Control service (such as the state one), or could be an external service. Policy Information Points (PIPs) are the components implementing the interaction with AMs to retrieve and update attributes. PIPs are required because the attributes for the evaluation of a Usage Control policy could be managed by distinct AMs providing different protocols for interacting with them. Hence, PIPs provide the same interface to the Context Handler, while they implement the specific protocols to interact with the AMs they are paired to. A special AM is the State Handler (SH), which has been introduced to manage the system state and will be described in the next subsections. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a XACML evaluation engine that takes a policy and an access request as input, evaluates the policy for that request, and returns the decision. The Session Manager (SM) is an additional component with respect to the XACML reference architecture, meant to support the continuous enforcement of Usage Control policies while the accesses are in progress. In fact, the SM keeps trace of the current usage sessions (through a Data Base), and determines for which of these sessions the Usage Control policy must be re-evaluated when one attribute (or more) changes its value. The Context Handler (CH) is the frontend of the Usage Control service. Its role is to coordinate the other components of the UCON service to (continuously) evaluate the policy. Hence, the CH implements the evaluation of the policy by interacting with the PIPs to collect the updated value of the attributes, with the PDP to request the evaluation of the policy exploiting the collected attribute values, and with the SM to update the status of the usage session. The policy evaluation is triggered by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) when a new access request is performed by a user. Moreover, a policy re-evaluation for the ongoing accesses is performed by the CH every time an attribute update notification is received from a PIP. If, for a given ongoing access, the policy re-evaluation results in a violation, this access is revoked by the UCON service. To this aim, the CH sends a revoke message to the PEP, which is in charge to properly implement the access revocation. Finally, the Policy Administration Point (PAP) stores the Usage Control policies through the Policy Storage (PS) component, and includes the Transition Manager (TM), which is required for the system state management, as described in the following.
State Management
The core of the proposed History-based Usage Control systems is represented by the function defining the state transitions. Each specific History-based Usage Control Policy P defines a different state transition function, called nextState P , because the state transitions are determined by the POLPA operators used to combine the Usage Control Policies, which build P. This function determines the next state of the History-based Usage Control systems, according to the policy scope, by taking as input: (i) the current state of the History-based Usage Control systems; (ii) the Usage Control policy that has been enforced in that state; and (iii) the result of the policy enforcement (endAccess or revokeAccess). In the proposed model, the current state of the History-based Usage Control systems is represented as a mutable attribute. This attribute is paired to the environment, to the subject or to the object if, respectively, the scope of the Historybased Usage Control policy is "GLOBAL", "SUBJECT", or "OBJECT". Hence, when the policy scope is "GLOBAL", one instance only of the state attribute exists, and the actions performed by every subject on every object of the scenario affect this instance. Instead, when the policy scope is "SUBJECT", each subject of the scenario is paired with his own instance of the state attribute. In this case, when a subject performs an action, only his instance of the state attribute is updated by the policy.
In the History-based Usage Control system architecture, the state attribute is managed by a proper Attribute Manager, called State Handler (SH), which is deployed within the Usage Control system itself. The State Handler interacts with the rest of the system through its PIP, called P IP s , as shown in Figure 2 . As the other PIPs of the system, PIP s provides an interface which allows to retrieve the value of the current state and to update such value with a new one.
With reference to Example 1, the function nextState HU P ABC applied to the initial state S 0 and to the Usage Control policy U P A , returns S 1 as new current state for s when the access terminates normally (endAccess), while it returns the state S f ail when the access is interrupted because of a policy violation (revokeAccess). Instead, the new state resulting from nextState HU P ABC applied to the initial state S 0 and to the Usage Control policy U P B , would be S 2 , regardless from the result of the policy enforcement. The state S 1 enforces a Usage Control policy U P B and, when the action B has been executed, the current state is changed to S 3 . Again, the policy of Example 1 states that the new state is the same (S 3 ) both in case the result of the enforcement of U P B is endAccess or revokeAccess. Summarizing, the output of the function nextState HU P ABC for Example 1 is the following:
nextStateHUP ABC (S0, U PA, endAccess) = S1 nextStateHUP ABC (S0, U PA, revokeAccess) = S f ail nextStateHUP ABC (S0, U PB, endAccess) = S2 nextStateHUP ABC (S0, U PB, revokeAccess) = S2 nextStateHUP ABC (S1, U PB, endAccess) = S3 nextStateHUP ABC (S1, U PB, revokeAccess) = S3 nextStateHUP ABC (S2, U PA, endAccess) = S3 nextStateHUP ABC (S2, U PA, revokeAccess) = S f ail nextStateHUP ABC (S3, U PC , endAccess) = S4 nextStateHUP ABC (S3, U PC , revokeAccess) = S4
Implementation
The History Based Usage Control Framework comes as a flexible, adaptable, and portable software designed to be easily integrated in any setting and application environment. To this end, the Java programming language has been chosen to implement it as an application which can run in desktops or servers, being executed as a remote (web)service and easily ported on Android mobile devices. In fact, the framework is also available as an Android app to enforce history based usage control directly on mobile devices. As discussed, the core components of the framework are designed to be application inde- pendent, except for PIPs and PEPs, which are implemented for each specific use case, by extending provided interfaces.
The proposed system shows several similarities with a standard usage control framework, like the one described in [6] . The main difference lies in the presence of the State Handler (SH) and of the State PIP (PIP s ), and on a revised version of the Policy Administration Point (PAP), which includes the Transition Manager (TM). The SH and the P IP s are used to keep the current system state, and to update or query it when needed to handle history-based policies. The PAP, instead, consists of two main components (Fig. 2) : the Policy Storage (PS), which stores the U-XACML UPs and the POLPA HUP, and the TM, which translates the HUP and the UPs in a single History-based U-XACML policy, i.e., a U-XACML policy including the constructs required for managing the state. The PS stores all the U-XACML policies (UP) defined for any action which can be performed in the system, independently from the current state. Moreover, the PS stores in a separate file the HUP expressed in POLPA, which connects the UPs, defining the relation between states and allowed actions. The TM merges the POLPA policy and the various UPs in a unique U-XACML policy. The resulting policy is an U-XACML policy set, composed by the various UPs, relating them through the usage of the <Target> tag to specify the state in which each policy should be considered, and the <AttrUpdate> to model the state transition. To this end, the <UpdateTime> tag of the <AttrUpdate> is exploited to specify in the policy a different value for the next state depending on the reult of the policy enforcement. In particular, we define two different update times: post-update-endAccess, and post-update-revokeAccess. In the first case, the attribute update is executed if the action controlled by the policy is terminated by the user through an endAccess, while in the second case the attribute update is executed if the action is interrupted by our system while in progress. The new state value is determined through the nextState function previously defined. A schematic representation of this process is depicted in Fig. 3 .
As for the example represented in Fig. 1 , the TM produces a policy set of three policies. Let us suppose the system to be in the starting state, S 0 for the user s. In this state, only the policies U P A and U P B can be enforced. Hence, the TM adds the following clause to U P A and U P B in order to make them applicable only when the state of the requesting user is S 0 . Let us focus on U P A . According to the nextState function, if the action A terminates naturally, i.e., the result of the policy enforcement is endAccess, the <AttrUpdate> tag of U P A will specify as next state S 1 for the requesting user. This transition will be specified using the <UpdateTime> tag, with a post-update-endAccess value. The TM adds the following clause to U P A to implement this transition. For what concerns the management of the current state attribute, it is just another mutable attribute whose value is considered by the PDP to verify request compliance with the policy. Hence, whenever a usage request is issued, the P IP s enriches the access request by adding the value of the current state and sends the enriched request for evaluation to the PDP. As discussed, the framework exploits the <AttrUpdates> U-XACML construct to express the state transition, which will be practically enforced by the P IP s by sending the update request with the new value to the SH.
An example: Hydroelectric Dam
An example of critical infrastructure reflecting the aforementioned model can be represented by an automated Hydroelectric Dam, which faces, among the others, the security risks reported in [11] . The automated dam control system considers four hazard levels, namely (i) normal, (ii) alert, (iii) critical and (iv) emergency. The condition to transit from one level to the other is determined by the amount of water passing through the sluices, the number of workers in the structure and the possible presence of mechanical malfunctions. We consider two different set of users: administrators and operators. The considered actions, which should be controlled though usage control, include dangerous operations which might physically endanger the system, or violate privacy constraints of the workers. A list of operations are the following: -Open Sluice: can be performed only when the hazard level is normal.
-Stream low-res video: can be performed by administrators at any hazard level and by operators only at alert or higher level. If the video shows the presence of people in dangerous areas, the hazard level is increased by one. -Stream high-res video: can be performed by operators or administrators at critical level, to verify if endangered subjects may need assistance. The hazard level is brought back to alert when the endangered subjects are brought to safety. -Verify Sluice: verifies if the mechanism of a sluice works correctly. It moves the hazard level to alert if the system is not working and to critical if the water flux is above a specific threshold. -Close Sluice: blocks the water flux. The operation requires time and stops the productivity of the hydroelectric system. For this reason this operation can only be triggered by administrators, or by operators only at critical hazard level. If the operation fails and the system is in critical status, the hazard level is moved to emergency. The hazard level transits to normal if the operation is successful. -Force Evacuation: this operation can be triggered by administrators at critical hazard level and also by operators at emergency level.
Let us consider an emergency situation in which an accident has occurred in the dam. Initially the hazard level is set to "normal", thus the sluice is open. When the accident occurs, it is important to verify if there is someone who needs assistance in the dam. Both the administrator and the operator should check this by viewing the stream video of the surveillance cams, in such a way to possibly force the evacuation in order to both manage the alert situation and set again the status to "normal". The idea, is that, whenever a stream video access is performed, the hazard level increases by one. On the other hand, for each recovery action the hazard level decreases by one. To depict this situation through Usage Control Policies, we consider the following policies:
SHV is the policy regulating the possibility of the administrator to view a high resolution video stream, i.e., the action Stream high-res video, SHV for short, described above. As a result effect of the application of this policy the hazard level is increased by one.
-U P Op SLV is the policy that regulates the possibility of the operator to view a low resolution video stream, i.e., the action Stream low-res video, SLV for short, described above. As a result effect of the application of this policy the hazard level is increased by one.
is the policy that allows the Administrator to issue an evacuation alert.
is the policy that manages the verification of the sluice conditions.
is the policy that manages the closure of the sluice by the Administrator.
is the policy that manages the opening of the sluice.
Using our approach, these six policies can be combined in such a way that both the operator and the administrator can: (i) verify if someone endangered is in the building, (ii) call for the rescue team and (iii) try to recover the normal hazard level by forcing the evacuation and closing the sluice. The History-based Usage Control Policy HU P Em has a GLOBAL scope because the state is unique for all the subjects (administrator and operator) and objects (cameras, sluice, and evacuation procedure) involved in the scenario. The History-based Usage Control Policy HU P Em is defined as follows: HU P RD regulates the "force evacuation" actions as well as the actions related to the sluice. In particular, the policy U P Adm,Op F E and the sequence (U P Adm,Op V S ; U P Adm CS ) may be executed in both the possible orders. Note that, executing one of these actions, the hazard level decreases by one. If, after the recovery actions, the hazard level goes back to "normal" and the sluice can be opened again.
Related Work
The usage control is a well known paradigm used to enforce security policies in several setting and environments. The improvement proposed in this work should bring a stronger expressiveness, allowing the definition of more complex policies for different environments. The usage control model has been first define by Sandhu et al. in [10] . The work in [12] proposes the adoption of the UCON in collaborative computing systems, such as the GRID environment based on a centralized Attribute repository (AR) for attribute management. They use the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [1] to specify several aspects of the Usage Control model, exploiting more than one XACML policy for the different policies necessary in the Usage Control model. A first implementation of usage control in GRID systems which does not exploit XACML in [7] . This system uses in fact the POLPA language, to define history-based usage control policies. However, policies in POLPA, though expressive, are difficult to write and do not respect standards. The introduction of history-based policies in XACML proposed in the present work, allows to write expressive policies which can be mapped in the POLPA language, still using an easy, enforceable and standardized language. In [3] Pretschner shows an application of the Usage Control model to preserve people privacy in video surveillance systems. This work is mainly focused on the description of the video surveillance infrastructure and on how policies can be used to preserve user privacy, not allowing camera monitoring when some conditions are not met. Some ideas from this work could be applied to implement some of the security policies described in the dam setting proposed in the current work. However, the work in [3] envisions a system which does not allow the definition of history-based policies, which enables the enforcement of different security policies for different hazard-levels. Another language for security policy specifications is ConSpec, presented in [8] . The ConSpec language can be expressed either as a labeled transition system or in a text form to represent process algebra models, being thus able to define history-based policies. However, the ConSpec language is not compliant with standards, sharing thus the same strength and weaknesses of the POLPA language.
